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The term "projective tests" is customarily applied to several of the sharpest and most valuable weapons in the clinical psychologist's armoury. Some of these?the Rorschach test, for example?are well known; others are not, and indeed some depend for their effectiveness upon their deceptive similarity to verbal intelligence tests.
There are, nevertheless, essential differences between them and those methods of cognitive testing which were outlined in my first article.3 It is because of these differences that projective and cognitive tests can yield so much more diagnostically-valuable information when used to complement one another than when either technique is used alone.
Projective methods are based upon certain propositions about the manner in which individuals notice, attend to, comprehend and interpret stimuli which are presented to their senses?in brief, the principles of perception. Perception is essentially an active process of selecting and attending to quite a small proportion of the enormous number of stimuli which impinge upon the eyes, ears, and other receptors of the human body. It consists, roughly, in distinguishing those which have meaning for the individual from those which have not. A particular sight or sound has meaning for the individual if he is able to connect or relate it to the memory of a previous experience, to his inner imagination (fantasy) or to a need, fear, or idea of which he is at that moment conscious.
Thus the individual himself is the agency which endows external stimuli with meaning. In popular terminology, he "recognises" or "grasps" them. In familiar, everyday situations perceptions are readily related to a context of experience which the individual shares with other members of the society in which he lives; he interprets them and responds to them in ways which he has learned, and which are largely conventional. If, on the other hand, he finds himself in a strange, unfamiliar situation, the task of "structuring" perceptions or relating them meaningfully to ideas, places much greater demands upon him; and because he is bereft of learned rules-of-thumb, he will understand and respond to stimuli in a way that is to a large extent peculiar to, or characteristic of, himself.
It is in their differing degree of emphasis upon learned, conventional modes of behaviour and spontaneous, improvised responses that the principal distinction between cognitive and projective tests consists. For example, the intelligence-test question : "How many inches are there in two and a half feet?" is usually perceived and understood by the patient in relation to a familiar context of experience of such problems; he will respond by attempting a sequence of reasoning according to the rules of arithmetic which he has been taught. Most members of his social group would respond according to the same customary rules; and so his behaviour throws light upon his competence in applying what he Has learned rather than upon his more distinctively individual qualities. If, on the other hand, he is presented with an ink-blot and asked what it might be, these conventional cues are lacking. He has to endue the psychologist's question with meaning; he has to distinguish the relevant characteristics of the ink-blot, and to select from a variety of possible interpretations those which he feels he ^an appropriately communicate. The ambiguity and unusualness of the situation will consequently evoke behaviour that strongly reflects his own personality.
In practice, the ambiguousness and unstructuredness of a projective test is a matter of degree. In the first place, the twoperson social situation in which the test is administered provides the patient with certain guiding principles about what is expected of him : e.g. that he is expected to give responses, and that certain sorts of response might evoke a change in the psychologist's presently friendly attitude. Secondly, the test material itself may give quite clear cues about the sort of response that is required. In the Thematic Apperception Test, for example, the patient is required to devise short stories to account for the situations shown in a series of pictures. Almost all of these pictures show two or more persons; and for this reason it is usual for the subject to respond ^vith stories dealing, implicitly or explicitly, with relationships between people. The principal interest of the psychologist is not in the fact that the patient describes interpersonal relationships, but in the quality of the relationships which he describes.
In the Rorschach test, on the other hand, the patient is given no indication of the sort of responses which are expected. He is handed each of a set of ten ink blots in turn, with the simple request that he should report what he sees in them, or what they look like to him. The ink-blots printed on the ten cards vary considerably lri form and appearance, but all contain so many and such diverse associative possibilities that there are very few "usual" percepts. The patient is thus thrown entirely on his own resources, and must choose for himself not only the content of his percepts (i.e. whether he will look for animals or people or things) but also to which of the rnany characteristics of the blot material (tone, shading, colour, shape, etc.) he will attend. These discrete characteristics of the stimulus material can have no meaning for him unless they correspond to an idea or fantasy which is already in his mind. It follows that the responses which he gives to the psychologist are the product of his own ideas and those characteristics of the blots which he is able to relate to them?a principle that is sometimes described by saying that he projects his ideas on to the blots. But he does more than this; for he is obliged by the nature of his task to organise the stimulus material in such manner that the percept is recognisable to the psychologist. In responding to the test instructions the patient cannot help providing the psychologist with valuable information about his ideas and fantasies, his difficulties and anxieties in expressing or concealing these ideas, and his skill in organising them into an acceptable form.
One of the most difficult problems in clinical diagnosis has always been the patient who contrives to conceal pathological abnormalities of ideation and thinking, by watchful adherence to conventional modes of speech and behaviour. This is particularly likely to occur in the early stages of schizophrenic illness; despite his growing inner disturbance, the patient may succeed in maintaining so effective a censorship over his behaviour and speech that he appears to be simply a rather inhibited, anxious individual. The patient's ability to "put up a good front" may thus delay his diagnosis for long enough greatly to increase the difficulties of treatment.
In the unfamiliar test situation, however, this device breaks down. The careful rehearsing of previously-learned ways of behaving cannot help the patient, because he is confronted with an entirely new problem. He may, of course, refuse to respond at all?a circumstance which is itself a useful diagnostic clue. His responses, if he gives them, are likely to be revealing in a number of ways. The presence of pathological preoccupations?"over-valent ideas"?may be indicated by the repeated recurrence of a theme in several responses or Thematic Apperception Test stories. Where this happens, the stimulus material itself may be misperceived in order to conform to the dominating idea; for example, the sex identity of a person in a T.A.T. picture may be misrecognised, or the patient may entirely overlook the presence of one of the people depicted.
Failure of the ability to distinguish between the imagined and the real sometimes causes a patient to react to his percept as if it were a real thing; showing, for example, fear or revulsion for a creature perceived in a Rorschach blot, or indignation at the events portrayed in a T.A.T. card. In less extreme cases, inability to accept the possibility of an alternative interpretation of the stimulus material sometimes betrays the abnormal literalness of the patient's thinking.
The production of responses to projective test material, like the solution of cognitive test problems, is primarily an intellectual exercise in the sense that it involves thinking, reasoning, the capacity to criticise one's own performance, and the ability to communicate ideas by the use of words. Because of the vagueness of the projective test situation, however, this intellectual performance is unusually vulnerable to distortion or disruption by non-rational wishes, emotions and prejudices. Most of the classical types of "thought disorder" to which reference is made in psychiatric diagnosis are more readily elicited in this manner than in the conventional interview. The telescoped or "short-circuited" thinking of the schizophrenic, and the distorted reasoning of the incipient psychotic depressive are cases in point. The patient must devise and express his concepts without the help of directive questions, and is therefore likely to display verbal anomalies which he can conceal under more normal circumstances.
The facility with which projective tests can elicit specific symptoms has sometimes led to their use solely for this purpose. There are, however, great disadvantages and dangers in this procedure. Diagnostic testing is usually needed when the patient's presenting symptoms are mild and equivocal, and the psychologist rnust therefore concern himself with the difficult problems of discriminating between those idiosyncrasies and peculiarities which pccur among essentially healthy people and those which indicate an Spending breakdown into acute illness.
The first requisite under such circumstances is that each symptom or characteristic upon which clinical interest is focused ntust be considered in relation to what is known of the patient's Personality and functioning as a whole. This is particularly important in the differential diagnosis of neurotic states : test behaviour which is a clear indication of acute neurotic illness in one individual niay simply be an aspect of an odd, but workable, adjustment in another. Secondly, it is necessary that, as in cognitive testing, the Psychologist should make as much use as possible of norms and standard criteria. There are great difficulties involved in recording and scoring projective test material in such a fashion that statistical norms can be derived from it. These problems have been partlysolved in the case of the Rorschach test, but in all projective techniques much of this normative material is qualitative in form and is necessarily embodied in case-descriptions and specimen Protocols.
The clinical use of projective tests involves the adoption, either Explicitly or by implication, of some system of psychopathological theory. Historically, these techniques have been developed mainly Nvithin the framework of psychoanalytic theory; indeed, many of the assumptions upon which the various projective procedures are based are derived from that system. Attempts to divorce projective testing from psychoanalytic concepts have so far met with little success. One unfortunate result of dissatisfaction with the psychoanalytic rationale of projective tests has been an attempt by some practitioners to dispense with all theoretical concepts and to apply the tests in an empirical fashion?using, for example, individual scoring categories in the Rorschach as self-supporting diagnostic indicators. This method has not proved particularly useful, and appears to lead inevitably to the development of implicit theoretical assumptions which are the more dangerous because they are unrecognised.
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of the projective techniques in diagnosis is that they have the superficial appearance of being easy to apply. It is a great mistake to suppose that an acquaintance with psychiatric nosology and what is rather vaguely called "clinical insight" constitute sufficient equipment for the user of these complex and difficult instruments. Both cognitive tests and the projective techniques make heavy demands upon the skill and specialised theoretical training of those psychologists who apply them; without such training it is disastrously easy to draw facile inferences which may have serious consequences for the patient's progress.
The modern techniques of diagnostic testing with a battery of cognitive and projective tests, pioneered by Rapaport and his colleagues at the Menninger Clinic1' 2, have considerably enhanced the value of the psychologist's contribution to the diagnostic process. It is no longer his function simply to furnish isolated fragments of information about the patient's intelligence or memory : he is now able to give a coherent, systematic account of the psychological functioning of the patient which can be invaluable to the psychiatrist in the prescription of treatment as well as in diagnosis.
